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Abstract
Using population representative survey data from theGerman Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) and administrative pension records from the Statutory Pension
Insurance, the authors compare four statistical matching techniques to comple-
ment survey information on net worth with social security wealth (SSW) infor-
mation from the administrative records. The unique properties of the linked
data allow for a straight control of the quality of matches under each technique.
Based on various evaluation criteria, Mahalanobis distance matching performs
best. Exploiting the advantages of the newly assembled data, the authors include
SSW in a wealth inequality analysis. Despite its quantitative relevance, SSW is
thus far omitted from such analyses because adequate micro data are lacking.
The inclusion of SSW doubles the level of net worth and decreases inequality
by almost 25 percent. Moreover, the results reveal striking differences along
occupational lines.
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Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the popularity of statistical matching has steadily
increased, not just in sociology and economics (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd
1997; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) but also in other disciplines (Baiocchi et al.
2010). In the social sciences, studies based on statistical matching typically
evaluate the efficacy of government policies and programs (Dehejia and
Wahba 1999). In these applications, researchers face the fundamental problem
of not knowing how a treated individual (e.g., a person who participated in a
certain program) would have fared if he or she had not received the treatment
(Arceneaux, Gerber, and Green 2010; Morgan and Harding 2006). Statistical
matching helps overcome this constraint by comparing the difference in out-
comes between individuals who share a set of common background character-
istics and who either do or do not receive a certain treatment (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983).
Statistical matching also comes into play when required data are not avail-
able in one, but several data sets that cannot be linked over a unique identifier
(Kadane [1978] 2001; Moriarity and Scheuren 2001; Rodgers 1984).1 This
problem occurs if mounting a new survey is too costly or if survey respon-
dents are unable to provide reliable information. In these situations, statisti-
cal matching links records from one data set with needed information from
the second source (Rubin 1986). The linked information is not from the same
individuals, but rather from observations with identical (or almost identical)
background attributes in both data sets (Elliott and Davis 2005).
This article applies statistical matching for the purpose of data fusion and
not for the estimation of causal effects in a treatment/control group setting.
Given there is no unambiguous theoretical foundation on how to complement
one data set with information from another, this article compares four variants
of statistical matching in order to identify the best technique for the data at
hand (Little 1988; Ra¨ssler 2002). The objective is to complement survey data
on net worth from the population representative German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) with information on social security wealth (SSW) from the Sam-
ple of Active Pension Accounts (SAPA), an administrative data set maintained
by the Deutsche Rentenversicherung, the German Statutory Pension Insur-
ance.2 The unique properties of the matched data provide an effective control
for the quality of matches under each statistical matching strategy, thus
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allowing the authors to assess which technique fares best for the data at hand
(Masterson 2010). An additional link to divorce statistics, as divorce affects
pension rights for the individuals involved, thus controls for otherwise uncon-
sidered effects that arise from a marital split.
The newly assembled data opens up countless research possibilities. We
exploit the data and perform a wealth inequality analysis that includes SSW.
Social security wealth is defined as the current sum of pension entitlements a
person has accumulated in a given year—in this application, 2007. For retirees,
SSWequals themonthly social security benefit,whereas for individualswhoare
still in the workforce, it is the current amount of entitlements stored in their
social security earnings record.3 So far, SSW is omitted from wealth analyses
because of the lack of adequate micro data. While the SOEP collects extensive
wealth data, information onSSW is difficult to obtain because respondents typi-
cally do not know their current pension entitlements, unless they are already
retired and receiving amonthly benefit payment.4 In contrast, the Statutory Pen-
sion Insurance keeps data on SSW, but lacks information on standard wealth
categories and covariates that are beyond the needs of the agency. Especially for
comparative analyses, the omission of SSW from standard wealth estimates
raises issues of comparability (Frick and Headey 2009). Including SSW helps
us to draw a more precise picture of the distribution of wealth in Germany.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: The second section
sets out some background information on the system of old age provision in
Germany and the concept of SSW. The third section describes the data and
the fourth section presents the overall matching strategy. The fifth section
contrasts four statistical matching techniques and compares their perfor-
mance for the groups of retirees. The technique that serves our purpose best
is then applied to the total population providing the basis for the extended
wealth measure that includes SSW. The sixth section presents the results
of the wealth inequality analyses and the final section closes with some con-
cluding remarks.
The System of Old Age Provision in Germany
Distinctive institutional features account for differences in old age provision
across occupational groups in Germany. The Statutory Pension Insurance cov-
ers the majority of the German resident population but systematically excludes
certain groups, such as civil servants or the self-employed. To appreciate dif-
ferences in coverage and the accumulation of SSW across occupational
groups, this section briefly sketches the system of old age provision in Ger-
many and highlights the consequences for the statistical matching exercise.5
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TheStatutoryPension Insurance is compulsory andby far themost important
pillar in the provision of retirement benefits inGermany. Throughout their adult
working lives,more than90percent of the population contributes at least once to
the public pension scheme. Today, the scheme covers more than 35 million
actively insured individuals and pays benefits to almost 25 million retirees
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung 2010).6 Benefits from the public pension
scheme are still the predominant source of retirement income for this group
(Kortmann and Halbherr 2008) with occupational and private pensions clearly
playing a secondary role.7 For employees, the accumulation of SSW usually
starts with the first job that is subject to social insurance contributions and ends
with the transition into retirement. In these type of jobs, employees pay contri-
butions into the social security system, a certain fixed share of their earnings up
to somemaximum amount. The employermatches these payments.8 By paying
contributions into the system, employees accumulate SSW. Individuals can also
accrue pension rights during certain periods of nonemployment, such as spells
of education, unemployment, or sickness. And finally, divorce affects the indi-
vidual’s SSW as well. The Statutory Pension Insurance carries out a splitting of
pension rights accrued by husband and wife during their marriage (see Second
Match: ‘‘Record Linkage’’ of SAPA and Divorce Statistics subsection for fur-
ther details).9 Taking all these factors into account, SSW corresponds roughly
to the individual’s earnings history and retirement benefits are a proxy for a per-
son’s lifecycle labor market attachment.10
A separate, noncontributory, pension scheme covers the 1.8 million active
civil servants and provides benefits to 680,000 former public sector employees
and to 300,000 survivors (Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit and Soziales 2008).
By definition, civil servants become part of the civil servants scheme from
which they cannot, and have no reason to, opt out. Their SSW does not accu-
mulate over the life cycle, but solely depends on the final salary before retire-
ment and years of service. With its generosity, the German civil service
pension scheme stands out in comparative perspective, mitigating any need for
additional retirement income.11 Typically, we do not observe civil servants in
SAPA data. Exceptions are those individuals who were not civil servants from
the beginning of their career. In this case, they have worked for several years
and accumulated SSW within the statutory pension insurance program.
For the 4.5 million self-employed in Germany, the system of old age pro-
vision is most heterogeneous. In fact, about 25 percent are permanently
insured by separate compulsory schemes, including farmers and those in the
liberal professions, such as lawyers or medical doctors. However, there is
unequal conditions in terms of coverage and the provision of benefits While
benefit levels for farmers are comparatively low, those self-employed in the
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liberal professions enjoy replacement rates comparable to those of civil ser-
vants (Loose and Frommert 2009). The rest of the self-employed lack formal
coverage: Some rely exclusively on voluntary private pension investments,
whereas others accumulate entitlements in several different schemes. The
heterogeneity also has repercussions for the accumulation of SSW. For
self-employed in compulsory schemes, SSW accumulates over the entire life
cycle. The growing number of self-employed, without employees, typically
has alternating spells of self-and dependent employment, which therefore
also accumulate SSW in the public pension scheme.
This brief glance at the system of social security in Germany illustrates the
quantitative relevance of the public pension scheme for the majority of the
active and retired population. Over the course of their working life, they pay
a significant portion of their earnings into the system that cannot be invested
in alternative forms of old age provision. But this review also shows pro-
nounced differences across occupational lines. These differences require spe-
cial diligence in the matching and imputation exercise.
Data
In this article, we want to complement a standard measure of net worth with
information on SSW as of 2007. Net worth is defined as the sum of owner-
occupied and other real estate holdings, financial assets, assets from life
insurance policies and private pension schemes, building loan contracts,
business assets, valuables, net of any outstanding mortgage, and consumer
debt. The extended wealth measure, which the authors present in this article,
adds SSW to this standard net worth measure in order to provide a more
comprehensive analysis of wealth and inequality in Germany. For this pur-
pose, the authors present a double-match involving three data sets.
The first match employs 26 waves of panel data from the population rep-
resentative German SOEP and links it with the SAPA. The SOEP is a broad
interdisciplinary household panel study that started in 1984 (Wagner, Frick,
and Schupp 2007). It covers a representative sample of the total population
living in private households in Germany. The most recent accessible data
were collected in 2009 with about 11,000 households and 20,000 individuals
interviewed. The micro data provide detailed information on individuals,
households, and families, which enables researchers to monitor living condi-
tions over time. The standard components are surveyed annually, while spe-
cial topic modules are asked every few years. In 2007, a special wealth
module collected detailed wealth data at the individual level (see Frick,
Grabka, and Marcus 2007), except for information on SSW.
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The SAPA is a one percent random sample of pension accounts, containing
records for approximately 570,000 individuals, both actively insured and rec-
ently retired. These records are representative of all individuals holding a pen-
sion account.12 SAPA contains demographic and detailed benefit information,
including the individual’s aggregated SSW as of 2007. The longitudinal files
provide informationonmonthly earnings, unemployment spells, periods of child
care and long-term care, and so on. Like SOEP data, SAPA provides individual
information, but, however, SAPA does not collect household information.
The second match links data from theDivorce Statistics Administering the
Pension Rights Splitting between Divorcees (henceforth, Divorce Statistics)
maintained by the Statutory Pension Insurance to SAPA data. This second
match solely serves the purpose of correcting for otherwise unconsidered
effects (in the SOEP–SAPA match) that arise from a marital split. For this
second match, the authors use record linkage.13 The Divorce Statistics cover
all divorce settlements—a total of 5.5 million cases—that involved a split-
ting of pension rights between ex-spouses since its introduction in 1977. Fur-
ther, the scope of variables pertaining to the individual’s marital history in
divorce statistics go beyond those in SAPA, such as the month and year the
marriage started and ended, but no information on the individual’s current
marital status. However, the information is only available for those individ-
uals who experienced a divorce settlement. Hence, this sample population is
different from the SOEP and SAPA sample populations.
First Match: Linking SOEP and SAPA
Notation and Conditional Independence
Irrespective of which variant of statistical matching we opt for in order to link
SOEP and SAPA, we face the following initial situation. There are two sam-
ple files A (SOEP) and B (SAPA) that share a set of common variables and
some variables unique to each data set. The background attributes observed
in both data sets are referred to as X variables, X ¼ ðX1; . . . ;XpÞ. Variables
unique to the SOEP will be referred to as Y variables, Y ¼ ðY1; . . . ; YQÞ,
whereas variables unique to SAPA will be referred to as Z variables,
Z ¼ ðZ1; . . . ;ZRÞ. By means of statistical matching, we complement Y vari-
ables on net worth with the Z variable on SSW using the common X vari-
ables. The population representativeness of SOEP data dictates the
matching direction: SOEP is the recipient and SAPA the donor file.14
We face an identification problem, because we do not observe net worth
and SSW jointly and their covariance is unknown. For the results to be
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meaningful, the conditional independence assumption (CIA) has to hold,
meaning that Y and Z variables are conditionally independent given the
matching variables X (D’Orazio, Di Zio, and Scanu 2006; Ra¨ssler 2002).
Comparing Four Variants of Statistical Matching
In order to find the best statistical matching approach to complement infor-
mation on net worth with SSW for the data at hand, this article compares four
techniques. These techniques cover the range of available statistical match-
ing routines going from relatively simple approaches such as the random
within cell hot deck imputation to more refined techniques such as Mahala-
nobis distance matching, which takes the maximum of continuous X vari-
ables into account.
Random within cell hot deck imputation (henceforth, ‘‘hot deck’’) com-
pletes records with missing data points with values from statistically similar,
but complete records (Andridge and Little 2010; Ford 1983). Typically, both
records—complete and incomplete—are part of the same data set. In our
application, SSW is missing for all SOEP, but available for all SAPA
records, which corresponds to the setup for cold deck routines. In this article,
we pretend that sample file A and B originate from the same data. Therefore,
we apply hot deck imputation to replace missing values of SSW in SOEP
data with observed values in SAPA. The imputation is carried out within pre-
defined matching strata using a number of common categorical X variables.15
Within these groups, missing values are imputed by random assignment.
Based on SAPA data, regression imputation estimates multivariate ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression models within different imputation
classes. In these models, the individual’s SSW is a linear function of the X
variables, the set of background attributes available in both data sets. Based
on the estimates, the authors perform out-of-sample predictions of SSW,
imputing the respective value for all SOEP observations. To mitigate the
regression to the mean effect inherent in predictions, residuals are randomly
assigned to the respective predictions to preserve the variance of the distri-
bution (Copas 1997).
Strictly speaking, predictive mean matching (PMM) also belongs to the
group of hot deck imputation routines. PMM differs from the above hot deck
approach in that it combines parametric and nonparametric techniques to
impute a single variable with missing values (SSW). In a first step, PMM
makes use of a parametric model (OLS regression) that describes the individ-
ual’s SSW as a function of all matching variables. In a second step, PMM
selects from all fully observed units the nearest neighbor donor that has the
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smallest distance to each incomplete observation (Little 1988; Rubin 1986).
Unlike regression imputation, PMM imputes actually occurring and not con-
structed values.
Mahalanobis distance matching (Mahalanobis 1936) is a procedure fre-
quently used in cluster analysis. The procedure calculates a Mahalanobis dis-
tance dij comparing each observation iA in the SOEP to each observation jB in
SAPA based on a vector of the common X variables. The statistical donormini-
mizes the distance dij between the SOEP respondent and the SAPA observation.
Unlike theEuclidean distance, theMahalanobis distance score incorporates both
correlations between matching variables and differences in variances. First, this
implies that highly correlated matching variables do not enter the computation
of the Mahalanobis distance with the same weight. Further, the Mahalanobis
distance controls for differences in variances of the considered matching
variables. Later, we will show why this property is useful in this application.
For all techniques, the authors apply a single imputation instead of mul-
tiple imputation routine in order to augment the measure of net worth in
SOEP data with information on SSW from SAPA data. The application of
single imputation is sufficient, given that the following analysis of extended
net worth does not aim at drawing inference.16
Matching Variables
The set of common X variables distinguishes categorical slice and continuous
matching variables.17 Slice variables partition the data to only match individ-
uals within certain predefined strata. The partitioning avoids matches of indi-
viduals that are sufficiently dissimilar, especially if these groups are believed
to differ in how they accumulate SSW. Matching variables determine the
best imputation or matching partners in SOEP and SAPA. The statistical
matching occurs within six imputation classes.18 Both data sets are stratified
by gender, region, and immigrant status, resulting in the following classes:
West German men, West German women, East German men, East German
women, male migrants, and female migrants.19 As for continuous matching
variables, annual income measures dominate the matching exercise. We use
an aggregate income measure that summarizes all income that qualifies for
the accumulation of pension rights prior to the transition into retirement
(earnings, unemployment benefits, sickness allowances, etc.). These vari-
ables are highly relevant because in a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, they
are the best predictors for the individual’s SSW.20
The income measure enters the equation as a three-year moving average
to smooth individual income histories (average annual income for the years
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1983 to 1985, 1984 to 1986, 1985 to 1987 . . . 2004 to 2006). For all 2007
SOEP respondents with incomplete income profiles, we impute missing
information starting in 2006 and going backward to 1983 for West Germany
and 1991 for East Germany. The backward imputation applies a single
regression-based imputation routine with random residual assignment. This
routine makes maximum use of all available longitudinal information since
the respondent’s first participation in the SOEP.21 For reasons of comparabil-
ity of SOEP and SAPA, earnings are cut at the effective maximum contribu-
tion ceiling for each year.22 Differential treatment of earnings in the statutory
pension insurance depending on whether a person is a regular employee, civil
servant, or self-employed requires consideration in the imputation.
A woman’s fertility history is an additional piece of information that enters
the matching as it determines the number of childcare credits that a woman
receives.Women receive one year of pension credits for all children born before
1992 and three years for all children born thereafter.23We include the total num-
ber of childcare credits each woman has in 2007. In addition, various duration
variables enter the computation. These measures reflect the number of years
spent in different activities such as employment, unemployment, education,
compulsory military, or community service (only for men), as well as long-
term care giving. Finally, thematching and imputation exercise includes the age
of the respondent in 2007.
This article tests the performance of four techniques that make different
use of the available matching information: The hot deck approach ignores the
continuous matching variables and imputes randomly within the six strata, in
contrast to the other three approaches that also take the continuous variables
into account.24
Second Match: ‘‘Record Linkage’’ of SAPA and Divorce Statistics25
The special role divorce plays in the accumulation of SSW cannot be
addressed in the first match of SOEP and SAPA. This shortcoming is due
to the fact that when SOEP respondents report their monthly pension benefit,
it is impossible for them to tell entitlements resulting from employment (or
other individual pension relevant circumstances) and those resulting from the
divorce settlement apart. Hence, the authors expect that the premium or
deduction resulting out of the pension splitting between former husband and
wife leads to a systematic bias in the linkage of SOEP and SAPA.
These potentially biased matching results motivate a second match of
SAPA and Divorce Statistics using record linkage. Information available
in the Divorce Statistics allow for the correction of the divorce bias. With
200 Sociological Methods & Research 42(2)
estimates from OLS regression models for each of the six matching classes,
we correct for this bias in SOEP data. However, it is not feasible to correct
the divorce bias by linking records of SOEP and Divorce Statistics due to the
lack of uniquely identifying variables.26 Moreover, information from the
Divorce Statisticswould not benefit the statistical matching of SOEP–SAPA,
as it does not add any relevant information for the analyses on the distribution
of wealth in Germany. Figure 1 summarizes the double-matching approach.
Assessing the Quality of Matches: Which Technique
Performs Best?
Sample Specification and Evaluation Criteria
We test the performance of each matching technique based on the population
of retirees. For this group, the data provide an effective benchmark to assess
the quality of the matches. Retired SOEP respondents provide the presum-
ably true monthly pension benefit (henceforth observed benefit) that allows
for the comparison with the simulated benefit (henceforth, matched benefit)
from each of the four matching techniques, respectively.27
We perform this test for recently retired individuals aged 60 to 67. To guar-
antee the consistency of both sample populations, the samples do not include
disability pensioners because of significant differences in eligibility rules and
Figure 1. Statistical matching process—SOEP, VSKT and Divorce statistics.
Source: Authors’ Illustration.
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pension benefit calculation as compared to old age pensioners. The analysis
excludes civil servants because they lack pension-relevant income for most
parts of their working life. If they accrued any entitlements in the public pen-
sion scheme, these are typically credited against their civil servants pension
when they retire. For self-employed individuals in the SOEP, income informa-
tion was set to zero for the years of self-employment because it is typically not
pension-relevant. The samples consist of 659 SOEP and 34,353 SAPA
observations.
We assess the validity of each approach using three criteria: (1) the correla-
tion coefficient of the observed and matched public pension benefit; (2) the
average differences between observed and matched benefit and the respective
standard deviations; and (3) for the overall fit, a graphical representation (ker-
nel density plots) of the individual differences between observed and matched
benefit. Each criterion is evaluated for the total population and within each of
the six matching strata.28 The combination of criteria provides a good basis for
the assessment of matching quality. Even though high correlation coefficients
point toward a strong association, they do not tell whether the observed and
matched pension benefits fall in the same range. Average differences between
observed and matched benefits, as well as standard deviations, indicate whe-
ther the matching systematically assigns too high or too low values that result
in a systematic bias. A kernel density plot is a good descriptive mean to check
whether the distribution of individual differences is centered on zero, sym-
metric, and has a small variance.
Results
For the total population of retirees, pairwise correlations between observed
and matched public pension benefits are best for Mahalanobis matching. The
correlation coefficient rMAHA of almost 0.7 is slightly higher than for PMM
and the regression-based approach with 0.67 and 0.68, respectively. Hot deck
imputation clearly lags behind (rHOT ¼ 0.22). The lack of association
between observed and matched benefit for hot deck imputation is also true
for the within-group correlations that range from 0.53 for female migrants
to 0.17 for East German women. This result is due to the random assignment
of matching partners without taking further continuous information into
account.
For the other three techniques, within-group correlations always fall
below the correlation coefficient of the total population except for the rather
small group of female migrants (rMAHA ¼ 0.82, rREG ¼ 0.79, and rPMM ¼
0.76). Concerning the other matching strata, PMM performs best for East
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German men (rPMM ¼ 0.45) and male migrants (rPMM ¼ 0.63), the
regression-based approach for East and West German women with 0.55 and
0.65, respectively. Mahalanobis fits best for female migrants (rMAHA ¼ 0.82)
and West German men (rMAHA ¼ 0.43). Since the results are rather inconclu-
sive with none of the techniques standing out, the correlation coefficient
alone is not a sufficient criterion for the decision, which technique to apply.
The second evaluation criterion is the mean difference between observed
and matched benefit:
di;j ¼ SOEPSSWretired  SAPASSWretired
nretired
:
The difference describes how far off the matched benefit is from the observed
publicpensionbenefit.A small averagedistanceand standarddeviation are indi-
cators for a goodmatch. Considering the distance criterion for the total popula-
tion, hot deck imputed values fare best when it comes to the average distance
(dHOT¼ 16.4), but poorly with respect to the standard deviation of 542.8. This
standard deviation is significantly higher than for all the other techniques.
Mahalanobis is secondbest in termsof distance and bestwith respect to the stan-
dard deviation (dMAHA¼74.8; SD¼ 320.6). The regression-based approach
and PMM are quite similar in their performance (dPMM¼101.6; SD¼ 327.5
and dREG¼ 105.5; SD¼ 328.8), but clearly lag behindMahalanobis matching.
In Table 1, we rank the performance of techniques with respect to the
within-group average distances and standard deviations between observed and
matched benefit. The upper panel provides the average differences; the bottom
panel displays the standard deviations. With respect to average differences
between observed and matched benefit, Mahalanobis matching works best for
West German men (dMAHA ¼ 34.7) and male migrants (dMAHA ¼ 90.7).
Hot deck imputation performs best for East and West German women (dHOT
¼53.6; dHOT¼ 39.1) and female migrants (dHOT¼110.4), but clearly pro-
vides the worst results for men. PMM yields the best results for East German
men (dPMM ¼ 105.8). Across all groups, Mahalanobis renders the best out-
come with respect to the average distance criterion (average rank of 1.6).
Despite comparatively small average distances for groups 4 to 6 under hot
deck, the standard deviation is by far the highest under hot deck across all
groups. With respect to the standard deviation, PMM performs best for East
German men as well as East and West German women, whereas Mahalano-
bis is better for West German men and male migrants. For female migrants,
the distribution of matched values from the regression-based imputation and
Mahalanobis has the lowest standard deviation. Overall, PMM and
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Mahalanobis fare best concerning the standard deviation, whereas hot deck
performs worst, by far. With respect to both criteria, the within-group aver-
age differences between observed and matched benefits as well as the stan-
dard deviations, Mahalanobis is superior to any other technique.
Kernel density plots depict the distribution of differences between observed
and matched benefit information for all four approaches. Ideally, these plots
are symmetric, unimodal, and clustered around zero with a small standard
deviation. Figure 2 presents the kernel density plots for the total population.
The graphic representation underlines that hot deck is not the appropriate
imputation technique. The distribution of differences has a substantial stan-
dard deviation with very long tails on both sides. Despite its better perfor-
mance relative to hot deck, the PMM distribution has no unambiguous
peak. The distribution (dashed grey curve) appears to be much wider at the
top with several smaller peaks. The kernel density plots for the regression
approach (dotted curve) and Mahalanobis (solid curve) come closest to the
ideal. The distribution for Mahalanobis is centered on zero but shows a small
bump at þ250 Euro. The kernel density curve for the regression-based tech-
nique has no such bump, but the peak of the distribution is more spread out.29
Table 1. Average Distance and Standard Deviation Between Observed and Matched
Benefit Across Matching Techniques.
Men
East
(n ¼ 126)
Men
West
(n ¼ 138)
Men
Migrant
(n ¼ 47)
Women
East
(n ¼ 141)
Women
West
(n ¼ 154)
Women
Migrant
(n ¼ 28)
Avg.
Rank
Hot Deck Mean 124 112 203 -54 39 91
RankMean 4 4 4 1 1 1 2,5
Regression Mean 115 43 163 126 111 142
RankMean 3 2 3 4 3 3 3
PMM Mean 106 70 131 91 119 145
RankMean 1 3 2 3 4 4 2,8
Mahalanobis Mean 107 35 91 70 77 110
RankMean 2 1 1 2 2 2 1,6
Hot Deck Std. Dev. 400 701 682 339 566 486
RankSD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Regression Std. Dev. 291 387 409 298 315 218
RankSD 2 2 3 3 2 1 2,16
PMM Std. Dev. 256 448 389 250 312 219
RankSD 1 3 2 1 1 3 1,83
Mahalanobis Std. Dev. 316 376 382 260 317 218
RankSD 3 1 1 2 3 1 1,83
Source: SAPA (2007) and SOEP (2007); Authors’ Calculations.
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Overall, the divorce correction improved the quality of matches. Table 2
presents the absolute average distances (using Mahalanobis distance) with
and without the divorce correction for the divorced population only.30
Without the divorce correction, matched benefits were too large for divorced
men and too small for divorced women.31 The divorce correction shifts results in
the expecteddirection.Consequently, the absolute averagedistancechanged from
dW/O Correction¼124.0 to dW. Correction¼50.9 for East Germanmen and from
dW/O Correction ¼ 190.9 to dW. Correction ¼ 3.4 for West German men, respec-
tively.32 In turn, differences forwomenshifted in theopposite direction.Theabso-
lute average distance for East German women is dW/O Correction ¼ 8.5 without
and dW. Correction ¼ 60.7 with the correction. For West German women, the
difference shifts from dW/O Correction¼ 117.5 to dW. Correction¼58.4. For almost
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Figure 2. Kernel density plots for differences between observed and matched
benefit information, total population.
Source: SAPA (2007) and SOEP (2007); Authors’ Illustration.
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all groups, the divorce correction reduces the standard deviation of differences
between observed and matched benefit. Hence, the quality of matches for divor-
cees converges to the quality of nondivorced individuals.
The unique data situation allows for the test of conditional independence
based on the population of retirees for which we perform the statistical
matching and observe both variables: their net worth and social security ben-
efit. First, we run two OLS models: Model I regresses the matching variables
on the individual’s social security benefit; Model II regresses the matching
variables on total net worth. For the CIA to hold, the residuals derived from
both predictions have to be uncorrelated. For the total population of retirees,
we find a correlation of 0.057 with a t-statistic of 1.44. Therefore, we fail to
reject the hypothesis that the correlation coefficient is significantly different
from 0. Although it is impossible to test the assumption empirically, we
assume this proposition to be true for the total population.33
Discussion
Mahalanobis distance matching performs best if we factor in all three criteria.
Nonetheless, certain patterns require further explanation: First, a systematic
Table 2. Effect of the Divorce Correction—Only Divorcees.
Difference Between True and
Simulated Pension Benefit (Euro)
With Divorce
Correction
Without Divorce
Correction
Absolute
Effect
Total (n ¼ 137) Median 63.2 46.7 16.5
M 36.8 38.3 1.5
SD 347.6 379.3 31.7
Men East (n ¼ 26) Median 47.1 92.0 44.9
M 50.9 124.0 73.1
SD 296.3 338.3 42.0
Men West (n ¼ 33) Median 77.9 127.3 205.2
M 3.4 190.9 194.3
SD 382.3 425.9 43.6
Women East (n ¼ 25) Median 123.2 63.9 59.3
M 60.7 8.5 52.2
SD 212.1 219.2 7.1
Women West (n ¼ 42) Median 109.4 29.0 138.4
M 58.4 117.5 175.9
SD 388.0 363.9 24.1
Source: SAPA (2007) and SOEP (2007), Authors’ Calculations.
Note: Migrants are omitted because of the small number of divorced migrants in the SOEP
population.
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negative bias in the average difference between observed and matched benefit.
Second, significant between-group differences that point to better matches for
some groups than for others.
The average distances are negative for the total population as well as for
most of the individual groups, which indicates that the matched information
is systematically higher than the reported benefit. The payment of insurance
contributions for health and long-term care is one possible explanation for
this bias. SAPA data provide the gross public pension benefit.34 In turn,
SOEP respondents likely report their public pension benefit net of health and
long-term care premiums. Another explanation for the systematic bias is that
the matching exercise fails to take actuarial adjustments for early retirement
into account on the part of SAPA data, which possibly leads to an overesti-
mation of approximated pension benefits.35
We find substantial differences in the quality of matches: On average, the
quality is better for men than for women, better for West than for East Ger-
mans, and better for Germans than for migrants. Results of additional robust-
ness tests indicate that the quality of matches is closely linked to the number
of years a person has been observed in the SOEP as well as the number of
years with income information larger zero.36 Furthermore, the quality of the
match depends on how good a predictor the observed information is for the
individual’s final public pension benefit, given that we do not observe the
complete lifecycle of SOEP respondents.37
Matches are particularly good for West German men. For this group of
SOEP respondents, we observe the annual income for more than half of their
working life, which is a good predictor for their final public pension bene-
fit.38 In contrast, matches are less good for East German men. SOEP data col-
lection in East Germany started only after German reunification. Therefore,
the matching exercise dismisses almost two thirds of elderly East German
men’s working life that are relevant for their public pension benefit: First,
this group has claims in special and additional pension schemes for former
elites of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that increase the final ben-
efit significantly but cannot be controlled for in the data. Second, the labor
markets East German men worked in and their earnings before reunification
had nothing in common with the situation after the German reunification. In
the centrally planned economy everybody had a job and unemployment was
not an issue. This job security and the continuous working careers were
favorable for the accumulation of SSW of East German men. However,
post-reunification labor market experiences differed greatly with age-
earnings profiles being flat and returns to tenure and experience significantly
lower when compared to West German men (Orlowski and Riphahn 2009).39
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Unemployment, for a significant share of this group even long-term unem-
ployment largely limited the ability to accumulate SSW.40 These reasons
explain why the observation of only the most recent years might not be the
best predictor for the final pension benefit of East German workers.
The quality of matches is better for East German women than for East
German men. East German women benefit to a lesser extent from the transfer
of entitlements from special and additional pension schemes than men. The
biasing effects that these benefits have on the matching quality are therefore
less strong for women.41 Further, women in our sample were disadvantaged
with respect to earnings and occupations before, but also lacked proper
employment opportunities after reunification. The observed years of East
German women’s lives in the SOEP are to a greater extent representative for
the unobserved years, which improves the matching quality.
The matching results for West German women appear to be less good
than that for East German women. Despite a longer period of observation,
data mostly cover the period of economic inactivity of these birth cohorts
following the years of childbearing and childrearing. This inactivity is par-
ticularly prevalent among older birth cohorts of women as a consequence of
the strong female caretaker/male breadwinner notion promoted in the West
German postwar welfare state.42 Due to these rather uniform working pat-
terns, the years observed in the survey are not necessarily representative for
the unobserved period of life. Therefore, the second half of West German
women’s working lives is not such a good predictor for their final public
pension benefit. Following this line of argument, it comes as no surprise
that the matching quality is poorer for migrants. On average, years
observed for both male and female migrants fall short of those observed for
natives. It is likely that these years are not representative for the total
employment biography. Pensions based on bilateral social insurance trea-
ties with other countries also account for large differences between
observed and matched benefit information among migrants.43 For the anal-
ysis, it is infeasible to separate benefits earned in Germany from benefits
earned in other countries.
Based on the results, it is safe to apply Mahalanobis distance matching to
the working age population to obtain the best estimate of SSW. The authors
expect the matching quality to be even better for this segment of the popula-
tion: First, the number of observations is significantly larger (14,247 SOEP
with 288,655 SAPA observations); hence, SOEP observations have more
potential matching partners to choose from. And second, the SOEP covers
a greater share of peoples’ working lives, which feeds more reliable informa-
tion in the statistical matching and therefore reduces uncertainty.
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Wealth Inequality
Determining the Present Value of Pension Entitlements
The inclusion of SSW in the wealth inequality analysis requires the calculation
of the present value of pension entitlements (for a detailed description, see
Rasner, Frick, and Grabka 2011). The present value considers pension rights
from the statutory, company, and private pensions.44 For retirees, we substitute
the matched SSW with the true amount stated in the survey because this infor-
mation seems to be more reliable than any simulated benefit could possibly be.
For the working age employees, we keep the SSW as assigned by the Maha-
lanobis distance matching. The entitlements for active civil servants are
approximated in the following way: As a final salary scheme, gross earnings
during the last three years of service and the number of service years are the
basis for the calculation of benefits.
The actual calculation of the present value of recurring pension payments
requires information on life expectancy, retirement age, and the taxation of
retirement income. As for the life expectancy, the authors rely on the
2005/2007 life tables of the German Federal Statistical Office. The life tables
provide information on remaining life expectancy by sex and region (East
and West Germany). Finally, differential taxation of retirement income,
based on an individual’s working occupation, is accounted for in the calcula-
tions.45 For the calculation of the present value of such entitlements, differ-
ential 2007 tax rates apply depending on the occupational group. We assume
the future indexation of pension payments to be in line with inflation, so that
the real value of entitlements stays constant over time. For discounting pur-
poses, we assume an interest rate of 2 percent.46
The Distribution of Total Individual Net Worth and SSW
The wealth inequality analysis compares a standard measure of net worth to
an extended measure of net worth that includes SSW (henceforth, extended
wealth) obtained from the statistical matching.
In a first step, we separate total net worth and SSW and take a look at their
respective distributions. The first column of Table 3 indicates that the aggre-
gate net worth for individuals in private households in Germany amounts to
about 5.9 trillion Euro in 2007. If this amount was evenly split, each adult per-
son would have about 83,000 Euro at his or her disposal. Comparing mean and
median of the distribution of total net worth gives a first indication for the
degree of overall inequality. In fact, median wealth equals 15,000 Euro. Thus,
the mean exceeds the median by factor 5.5. With about 78,500 Euro, the
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average SSW comes close to average net worth (see column 2 in Table 3).47
But, the distribution of SSW is less skewed than that of total net worth, because
mean and median are closer. The mean exceeds the median by factor 1.7.
The evidence on the relationship between mean and median suggests sig-
nificant differences in the distributions of net worth and SSW. The wealth
shares provided in Table 3 further support this evidence. The top 20 percent
of the adult population hold almost 80 percent of total net worth, whereas the
three bottom quintiles own less than 3 percent of total net worth. About 28
percent of the adult population has no or even negative net worth, indicating
that liabilities exceed gross wealth. In contrast less than 5 percent of the total
population did not accumulate any SSW. Pension entitlements are by far
more evenly distributed than net worth, mainly because almost everybody
accumulates pension entitlements at least once over their working life. In
Table 3. Net Worth and Social Security Wealth in Germanya, 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Worth
(in €)
SSWb
(in €)
Extended
Wealth
(in €)
Change (%)
[(1)/(3)]
Sum in trillion Euro 5.908 5.581 11.489 94.5
Basic statistics
Mean 83,077 78,479 161,556 94.5
Median 14,751 46,680 94,675 541.8
Wealth shares (%)
Lowest quintile 1.5 0.9 0.4 126.7
2nd q. 0.4 5.2 4.5 1025.0
3rd q. 3.9 12.0 11.8 202.6
4th q. 17.3 24.1 22.4 29.5
Highest quintile 79.9 57.7 60.9 23.8
Population with zero or negative
wealth (%)
28.1 4.5 3.3 88.3
Inequality
Gini coefficient 0.80 0.56 0.60 24.6
HSCV 6.51 0.73 2.02 68.9
P90:P50c 14.15 4.11 3.82 72.9
Source: SAPA (2007) and SOEP (2007), Authors’ Calculations.
Note: HSCV ¼ half-squared coefficient of variation.
aPopulation: persons in private households aged 17 or older (N ¼ 69,321,834).
bWith a discount rate of 2 percent, without provision for dependants.
cLowest value of the top 10 percent in the wealth distribution in relation to the median
(50 percent).
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addition, income is subject to contributions only to an upper limit in the Stat-
utory Pension Insurance. Nevertheless, the highest quintile still holds the
bulk of SSW with almost 58 percent of total SSW. The Gini coefficient
reflects the differences in the distributions of these two wealth concepts. For
net worth, the coefficient equals 0.8 indicating a high degree of inequality,
whereas for SSW it amounts to 0.566.48
The inclusion of SSW in our extended wealth measure almost doubles the
average net worth (161,500 Euro). However, a much stronger increase could
be observed for the median, which reached nearly 95,000 Euro. Inequality is
decreasing by one quarter for the Gini coefficient when moving from the
standard to the extended measure of net worth. Those in the middle of the
distribution profit the most with wealth shares mounting by almost eight per-
centage points.
Net worth and Extended Wealth across Occupational Groups
The individual’s occupational status is a fundamental determinant not only
for a person’s income level and his or her ability to save but also an important
proxy for the level of net worth.49 Beyond that, the individual’s occupational
status is also relevant for the accumulation of SSW. The occupation deter-
mines the type of pension scheme a person belongs to and the rules by which
SSW accumulates (compare to the section The System of Old Age Provision
in Germany). Table 4 provides evidence on how occupational status relates
to wealth holdings in Germany. It compares the three measures of interest:
standard net worth, present value of SSW, and extended wealth. For a more
complete picture, Table 4 gives information on the age/sex composition of
each occupational group (median age and share of females) to better take
compositional differences into account.
The results reveal substantial differences in wealth holdings across occu-
pational groups. We also find that some occupational groups benefit to a
greater extent from the inclusion of the present value of SSW than others.
On average, net worth is highest for the self-employed, given that they must
save more to private old age pension plans and because of their business
capital itself, which makes a significant difference. Evidently, the more
employees a self-employed person employs, the greater their total net worth.
In contrast, unskilled, semiskilled workers and salaried employees (without
vocational training) hold roughly 34,000 Euro in financial and material
assets. In turn, skilled workers, such as foremen or masters, have nearly
70,000 Euro in assets, while employees with management responsibilities
hold more than 120,000 Euro.
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In general, civil servants own above average net worth, which is espe-
cially true for civil servants in executive or administrative positions, with
an average individual net worth of more than 140,000 Euro. Civil servants
in the subclerical or clerical service accumulate substantially less (67,000
Euro), but still more than skilled workers and salaried employees.
In line with the standard lifecycle model of savings (Modigliani 1988), the
elderly have above average net worth. This age effect is particularly striking
for retired civil servants with a measure of net worth of nearly 190,000 Euro.
In comparison, pensioners in the statutory public pension scheme have net
worth of less than 100,000 Euro at their command. Civil servants are at an
advantage in the accumulation of wealth not only because of the on average
higher educational attainment but also because they do not have to pay con-
tributions into their pension scheme, which allows for a higher saving rate.
The inclusion of the present value of SSW benefits civil servants most.
Retired civil servants have more than 310,000 Euro SSW, while the respec-
tive figure for pensioners in the statutory public pension scheme not even
reaches half of this amount (130,000 Euro). In the active population, it is also
the group of civil servants who profit the most from the inclusion of SSW.
For low- and medium-level civil servants, pension entitlements amount to
92,000 Euro. For high-level civil servants (executive and administrative
class), these entitlements are even higher (almost 150,000 Euro). In fact, their
SSW nearly doubles their net worth. Dependent employees do not benefit to
the same extent from the inclusion of the present value of SSW. For the var-
ious groups of blue- and white-collar employees, SSW ranges from 54,000
Euro to 75,000 Euro. Currently unemployed have an average SSW of
52,000 Euro. This finding underlines the important role the public pension
scheme plays in stabilizing the individual’s economic position, even in case
of (short term) unemployment. For the self-employed, the respective figures
vary on a somewhat lower level compared to dependent employees (between
35,000 Euro and 56,000 Euro). Unlike other occupational groups, it is in the
individual responsibility of the self-employed to provide for old age. They
typically invest in life insurance policies or property. Following from this,
the extended wealth measure clearly improves the position of civil servants
relative to the self-employed.50 Nonetheless, the self-employed stay on top of
the wealth distribution.
Conclusion
This article compares four statistical matching techniques to complement
data on wealth from a population representative survey with information
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on SSW from administrative pension records. Statistical matching proves to
be a suitable technique to link information not available in one data set, but
distributed across multiple data sets, which lack a common unique identifier.
Rigorous robustness tests for the group of retirees identify Mahalanobis dis-
tance matching to be the best performing approach for the data at hand when
compared to three alternative techniques.
Applying the statistical matching strategy to the total population allows for
the calculation of the present value of pension entitlements. The results illus-
trate that SSW represents a considerable source of wealth worthwhile to con-
sider in a wealth inequality analysis. Overall, SSW roughly amounts to 5.6
trillion Euro or—on average—78,500 Euro per adult. When combined with net
worth, SSW almost doubles the measure of extended wealth with an average of
more than 160,000 Euro. The extended measure of wealth reduces inequality
(Gini coefficient) by one quarter compared to standard distributional analyses
that only take financial and material assets into account. This marked reduction
in inequality is mainly the result of the lesser spread in the distribution of SSW
and due to the fact that almost every adult in Germany has at least some enti-
tlements in the various old age pension schemes. We also find striking differ-
ences in levels of SSW across occupational groups. With respect to their
position in the wealth hierarchy, civil servants benefit most from the consider-
ation of pension wealth in the extended measure of wealth.
Future research in the area of statistical matching should test already
available indicators (Ra¨ssler 2002; Ra¨ssler and Kiesl 2006) and aim at devel-
oping additional formal indicators to assess the matching quality. Ideally,
these indicators should work even in the absence of an effective benchmark,
such as the reported pension benefits of the group of retirees observed in the
survey. In this application, Mahalanobis distance matching is the best match-
ing technique, but it may not be in others. The comparison of four variants of
statistical matching is appealing because it helps us better understand the
compatibility of both data sets and which technique works best in which con-
text. These robustness tests also come into play if we plan to complement one
data set with more than just one variable from another data set.
Finally, establishing multiple statistical matching strategies might be one
research direction worth following. Multiple statistical matching follows the
idea of multiple imputation that has become the standard method to deal with
missing data (Rubin 1987). The application of multiple matching procedures
provide proper estimates of the variance that allow for research that goes beyond
the descriptive analyses presented in this article. For drawing statistical infer-
ence from thematchedSOEP–SAPAdata, the elaboration of a chained equation
approach or amultivariate normal imputationmodel (Schafer 1997) is certainly
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indispensable. Finally, multiple imputation routines could further enhance the
relevance statistical matching has for research questions that require the combi-
nation of data from separate sources.
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Notes
1. So-called record linkage requires a unique identifier and the informed consent of
survey respondents, because it links identical persons in two data sets. A 2009 pilot
study tested the willingness of SHARE respondents in Germany to allow for record
linkage using their Social Security Number (SSN). While 77 percent gave their
consent, only 64 percent of those respondents provided their SSN. It is not yet ver-
ified whether the SSN provided is always correct. This outcome implies that less
than 50 percent of respondents participating in the pilot study agreed to record link-
age. There is good reason to believe that there are systematic differences between
consenters and nonconsenters, which would add bias to the results. Another risk
associated with record linkage lies in selective panel attrition in subsequent waves
of the panel as a reaction of respondents to the record linkage efforts. For literature
on consent patterns, see Jenkins et al. (2006).
2. Record linkage is infeasible for data confidentiality reasons. Moreover, no
unique identifier is available in both data sets.
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3. This definition implies that young individuals in the sample population had less
time to accumulate pension entitlements than older persons, which is in line with
the underlying idea of pay-as-you-go pension schemes.
4. In 2006, the SOEP group performed a pretest asking for the person’s SSW. The
question was not answered by more than 92 percent of the respondents. Further,
the reliability of information collected from respondents is questionable as many
provided information that was outside the expected range.
5. One short note on how the former GDR’s pension scheme was incorporated into
the system of old age provision of reunified Germany: Prior to reunification, East
Germany’s system had three pillars: one social insurance system that was far less
generous than the West German scheme. In addition, the country had two special
pension schemes (Sonder- und Zusatzversorgungssysteme) targeted at former GDR
elites. With the German reunification, all entitlements accumulated in the former
were fully integrated into the West German system, which involved a quite gener-
ous transfer of entitlements in order to assure an adequate standard of living of
(future) retirees in East Germany. As a consequence, benefit payments for East
Germanmen are more or less comparable to levels inWest Germany. East German
women fare even better than West German women because of their more contin-
uous fulltime labor force attachment.
6. Actively insured persons have at least one period of paid contributions (payment
of compulsory or voluntary social insurance contributions, marginal employ-
ment) or creditable periods.
7. In occupational pension schemes, individuals can also accumulate SSW. These
schemes typically are not compulsory and vary with respect to the replacement
rate.
8. For 2010, the contribution level is 19.9 percent paid in equal parts by employee
and employer.
9. The partner who earned higher pension rights transfers half of the difference in
entitlements (deduction) to his or her former spouse (premium). In practice,
women are the principal beneficiaries of pension splitting, because of their com-
paratively weaker labor market participation. For the majority of divorced cou-
ples, the splitting takes place right upon divorce; premiums and deductions
remain unaffected by remarriage of either ex-partner.
10. The principle of equivalence, one of the guiding principles of the public pension
system, implies that benefits are roughly equivalent to contributions paid into the
system.
11. The replacement rate of civil servants who retire after forty years of full-time
employment amounts to 72 percent of their last gross earnings. In contrast, the
replacement level for the standard retiree (worked 45 years with average earn-
ings) reaches approximately 48 percent of previous earnings.
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12. A personal pension account is conditional on having at least one event over the
life course that constitutes rights in the Statutory Pension Insurance.
13. SAPA data and Divorce Statistics provide the identifiers for record linkage.
14. For reasons of sample selectivity, SAPA is not the adequate recipient file. SAPA
is selective for several reasons: First, certain groups are systematically excluded
from having a pension account in the Statutory Pension Insurance. Second,
account validation adds selectivity. The Statutory Pension Insurance asks every
insured person to confirm the information stored in their account, but they are not
obliged to do so. However, some people are more likely to validate than others.
The authors restrict the analysis to validated pension accounts, which signifi-
cantly reduces the sample size (336,069 instead of 568,586 observations). We
accept the reduction in sample size, because validated accounts provide the most
reliable information. For more information on account validation and selectivity,
see Rasner et al. (2011).
15. Categorized continuous variables can also enter the imputation routine as a
stratification variable. Any combination of stratification variables builds an
imputation class or matching stratum. Both terms are used interchangeably.
Cross-classification of a number of categorical variables can lead to many imputa-
tion classes, which possibly collides with an insufficient number of observations.
16. However, a further refinement might go in the direction of multiple imputations
to better capture proper estimates of variance.
17. There are numerous names for this type of variables (also cohort or stratification
variables). In the remainder of this article, the authors use the term slice variables.
The groups are named matching strata or imputation classes.
18. In theory, one could increase the number of slice variables in the statistical match-
ing. However, researchers face a trade-off: More imputation classes assure that
matching partners are sufficiently similar in terms of slice variables (e.g., demo-
graphic or labor market attachment). However, more imputation classes might pre-
vent observations from the recipient file to find the best matching partner in terms
of the continuous matching variables in the donor data. This situation might occur
if the best donor belongs to a different imputation class. In the literature, there is no
evidence on how to balance the number of slice and matching variables. However,
this question should be addressed formally in future research. In this particular
application, we opted for six imputation classes in order to have a sufficient num-
ber of observations in each class to perform the benchmark tests.
19. Migrants are not divided into East and West Germany in order to assure a suffi-
ciently high number of observations in the two migrant strata.
20. TheOnlineAppendix (whichcanbe found at http://smr.sagepub.com/supplemental/)
provides summary statistics of slice and matching variables as well of the target
variable.
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21. This reverse completion of income information was necessary, because other-
wise cases with missing values are excluded from the matching process. Further-
more, it improves the efficiency of the matching exercise assuming sufficient
quality and representativeness of the imputed income data. However, it means
that for some observations a significant portion of income information had to
be imputed depending on when people entered the SOEP sample.
22. In the survey data at hand respondents report their monthly earnings, whereas in
social security data earnings are cut at the maximum contribution ceiling, for
example, the amount above which no additional social insurance contribution
have to be paid and no additional entitlements are accrued. For 2007, the maxi-
mum contribution ceiling was fixed at €5,250 in monthly gross earnings for West
Germany and €4,550 for East Germany (Deutsche Rentenversicherung 2010).
For previous years, the income thresholds need to be adjusted accordingly with
the respective year- and region-specific values.
23. Each credit is worth one earnings point, equivalent to the average earnings of all
contributors in the respective year.
24. The authors are aware that the well-established hot deck imputation could be fur-
ther refined. There are two reasons that justify the application of this simple hot
deck variant: First, because the technique does not consider any of the available
continuous matching variables it can provide valuable insights into the relevance
of these variables to produce high-quality matches. The second reason for this
simple hot deck approach is the limitation in the sample size. If we added another
slice variable, such as grouped income, the size of the imputation slices would
become too small for testing the performance of each technique.
25. The analysis does not apply record linkage in the traditional way using a
unique identifier like the Social Security Number. However, with the combi-
nation of exact splitting amount, namely the splitting premium or deduction
(measured in earning points with a precision of four decimal places), region
(distinguishing 27 regional branches of the Statutory Pension Insurance),
gender, and age, we generate a code that uniquely identifies individuals in
the data and allows for a direct link of identical individuals in the divorce
statistics and SAPA data.
26. Moreover, information from the Divorce Statistics would not contribute to an
improvement of SOEP-SAPA matches. The divorce data do not contain any cur-
rent information on the individual’s marital status, even though this would cer-
tainly be an important slice or matching variable if it was included in SAPA data.
27. In the remainder of this article, the terms observed and reported benefits are used
interchangeably. Both describe the public pension benefit information provided
by SOEP respondents. As with all survey information, data are prone to response
error.
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28. We ran additional robustness tests to assess the stability of results by drawing five
random samples with replacement and five disjoint random samples without
replacement showing no notable variability. Results are available upon request.
29. In the Online Appendix (which can be found at http://smr.sagepub.com/
supplemental/), Figure A1 provides Kernel density plots of the distribution of
differences for each matching stratum. Results are satisfactory for larger slices,
such as men and women in East andWest Germany, whereas the two migrant strata
with small numbers of observations fare poorly for all techniques. The Discussion
section provides possible explanations for the bias in matches for male and female
migrants.
30. Because of the small number of divorced migrants in our sample, those results are
not further discussed.
31. Adding divorce as a slice variable is infeasible due to the small number of divor-
cees in the test population.
32. The shift is more significant for West than for East German divorcees, because
pension splitting was only introduced in 1991 and confined to entitlements
earned and marriages divorced thereafter.
33. Ra¨ssler and Kiesl suggest estimating the range of possible correlations of SSW
and net worth within the Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds for the remaining observa-
tions for which the variables of interest are not jointly observed (Ra¨ssler and
Kiesl 2006). This suggestion is worth testing; however, it goes beyond the scope
of this article.
34. From this gross benefit, the Statutory Pension Insurance pays health and long-
term care premiums and then transfers the net benefit to the retiree.
35. More than 50 percent of all new retirees face actuarial reductions for early retire-
ment in 2010 (Deutsche Rentenversicherung 2010).
36. The robustness tests compared observed and matched pension benefits for indi-
viduals with different levels of labor market attachment. The results of these tests
indicate that the matching quality is significantly better for individuals with a
strong labor market attachment, defined as forty or more years of employment
with income information throughout the observation period. In contrast, individ-
uals with long periods of nonemployment and, consequently, zero income fare
worse with respect to the matching quality. The results provide valuable insights
for the explanations of differences in matching results across the matching strata.
37. SAPA data provide earnings information for the entire working life, in contrast to
the SOEP, which started data collection in 1983 and 1991, respectively. For the
matching, we only use earnings information for the years available in both data
sets.
38. We also tested a matching algorithm exclusively restricted to income informa-
tion. This variant rendered exceptionally good results for West German men,
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underlining the predictive power of income for their final public pension benefit.
Results are made available upon request.
39. Orlowski and Riphahn (2009) suggest that for many East German men job-
specific human capital was outdated and did not match the requirements of the
job market in unified Germany.
40. Given that the production of SAPA data is directly linked to administrative pro-
cesses the available information is by nature more accurate, in particular when
measuring short spells of unemployment. In the SOEP, respondents might not
perfectly recall these shorter spells. Due to higher unemployment rates in East
Germany following reunification, these differences in measurement might con-
tribute to a greater difference between observed and matched pension benefit
when compared to West Germany.
41. With a share of 92 percent, men were highly overrepresented in the special pen-
sion schemes and to a lesser extent so in the additional pension schemes with 54
percent (Seitz 2003).
42. The weak labor market attachment of West German women is reflected in the
matching variables: For each year observed, more than half of this group has a
pension-relevant income equal to zero.
43. Persons who worked and accrued pension rights in Germany and another country
receive a so-called Vertragsrente (Himmelreicher 2005). Individuals qualify for
the payment of such a pension if the two countries have a bilateral social security
agreement (also totalization agreement).
44. In contrast to the SSW from the Statutory Pension Insurance, there is no compara-
ble information such as the SAPA available for company pensions and entitlements
for liberal professions. However, for the population of retirees, these pensions are
directly surveyed in the SOEP. This procedure leads to an underestimation of SSW
in the population of currently active members in the labour force.
45. So far, we only have the gross SSW for employees and civil servants. Their
retirement income is subject to a differential tax treatment. The annuities of civil
servants are already fully taxed. In contrast, life annuities, benefits from the pub-
lic pension scheme, agricultural old age funds, or pension schemes organized by
professional associations are taxed only to a certain degree (see §22 of the Ger-
man Income Tax Act).
46. In alternative specifications, we vary this interest rate at 1 and 3 percent; the
choice of the interest rate influences, by definition, the amount of the present
value but changes little in the underlying relationships between SSW and
occupational groups as described here (for more details, compare to Rasner
et al. 2011). Entitlements from private pension schemes require no present
value calculation, as this wealth component is already covered by the SOEP
questionnaire.
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47. The above calculations apply a discount rate of 2 percent. While this choice
might appear normative, this value reflects the long-term real interest rate for fed-
eral bonds in Germany. Alternatively, an interest rate of 1 percent and 3 percent
yields an aggregated net value of pension wealth of 6.5 and 4.9 trillion Euro,
respectively. The corresponding mean values amount to about 91,000 and
68,000 Euro.
48. Other indicators such as the half-squared coefficient of variation (HSCV) or the
P90 to P50 percentile ratio point in the same direction. For example, the results
for HSCV are even more pronounced with 6.5 for net worth and 0.7 for SSW,
mainly because of the top sensitivity of this indicator.
49. In the following section, a person’s occupational status refers to the information
provided in the SOEP individual questionnaire of 2007. It is however possible
that a person has previously worked in another profession, which may affect the
level of net worth and SSW.
50. Civil servants benefit to such a great extent from the inclusion of SSW because
they typically enjoy a continuous employment career without any interruptions
due to unemployment. Furthermore, the institutional design of the civil servants
scheme accounts for their favorable position. In the final salary scheme, the last
three years of earnings count, which are typically those years in which earnings
peak. In contrast, the Statutory Pension Insurance takes the entire wage history
into account.
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